Former Supreme Court Judge has passed a judgement on Wage negotiation principles. If anybody of our forum can explain about that. High Regards N.Devarajan
From India, Madras
1From India, Madras
Hi,
please read the above case here
regards,
Umesh Chaudhary
(welcomeumesh@yahoo.com)
================================================
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 7378 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Transmission Corpn., A.P. Ltd. & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
P. Ramachandra Rao & Anr
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & TARUN CHATTERJEE
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing
the writ appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Order of learned Single Judge allowing writ petition filed by
the respondents was affirmed.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Respondents retired from the services of the Andhra
Pradesh State Electricity Board (in short the 'Board") on
30.4.1990 after attaining the age of superannuation. The
Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. (in short the
'Corporation'), is the successor company of the Board which
came into existence with effect from 1.2.1990 by virtue of the
Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Reforms Act, 1998 (in short
the 'Reforms Act'). The pay scales of the employees were
revised with effect from 1.7.1990 by which time the
respondents herein were drawing maximum pay in the
concerned scale. The rational of fixing the date with effect from
1.7.1990 was that employees who retired prior to 1.7.1990 are
entitled to D.A. at the rate of 38% on the pension whereas the
D.A. payable to pensioners retired on or after 1.7.1990 is
12.4%, but not before the date of issue of the order. The
revised pay scales permitted grant of three annual increments
beyond the time scale in regard to those who had reached or
crossed the maximum pay as on 1.7.1986. However, in respect
of the respondents herein the additional amount was shown
as personal pay and the stagnation increments were adjusted
towards the said additional amount.
Questioning correctness of the action of the Corporation
and its functionaries the respondents herein filed writ a
petition. Prayer was to direct the appellants herein to fix their
pension and other terminal benefits at par with other UDCs.
retired on or after 1.7.1990 and to pay all the arrears of
pensions and other terminal benefits. Learned Single judge
having regard to the intended purpose of the scheme held that
the respondents have been discriminated while calculating the
pension on the ground that they had retired prior to the
introduction of the scheme. Stand of the employer in essence
was that the Board's proceedings Ms No 481 dated 4.2.1991
had application only to those who were on its rolls as on
1.7.1990. In view of the fact that the respondents retired on
30.4.1990 the said scheme has no application to them. In any
event the scheme was introduced keeping in view the
settlement dated 29.1.1991 entered into between the Wage
Negotiation Committee and the Board before the Joint
Commissioner of Labour and State Conciliation Officer in
terms of Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in
short the 'Act') and the same cannot be the subject matter of
interpretation in the writ petition. In the Appeal its stand
before learned Single Judge was reiterated before the Division
Bench. Stand of the writ petitioners was that the learned
Single Judge was justified in its conclusion.
The Division Bench upheld the view taken by the learned
Single Judge. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in
D.S. Nakara & Others V. Union of India (1983 (1) SCC 305) it
was held that the cut off date fixed was discriminatory.
In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
highlighted that the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench had not considered the issues in their proper
perspective. D.S. Nakara's case (supra) has no application to
the facts of the present case. There was no challenge to the
settlement and the only challenge relating to rational of fixing
the cut off date with effect from 1.7.1990. The conclusion that
the respondents were entitled to the stagnation increment
deducting the same from the personal pay is clearly tenable.
Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand
supported the judgment of learned Single Judge as affirmed by
the Division Bench.
A brief reference to the factual position would be
necessary. Relevant portion of the Board's proceedings dated
4.2.1991 are as follows:
"The scales of pay of Office Staff, O& M
Staff, Construction Staff, Medical Staff, Fire
Fighting Staff, Security Staff and Teaching Staff
etc. were revised with effect from 1.7.86 in the
B.P. first read above as subsequently amended,
as per the negotiated settlements with the
employees Unions. The said settlements expired
on 30.6.90."
As result the earlier settlement expired on 30.6.1990 the
paras 5 & 6 are also relevant and they read as follows :
"The A.P.S.E. Board also directs that the
amount of stagnation increments not released
earlier in 1986 pay scales but adjusted against
P.P. shall now be released on 30.6.1990 but
effect shall be given from 1.7.1990 or from the
date of going over to the revised scales, as the
case may be, this amount will be taken into
account for the purpose of fixation of pay in
the revised pay scales.
The date of option for the revised pay scales
shall be 1.7.1990 or the date on which an
employee earns his next increment in the
existing scale of pay."
The notification issued on 4.2.1991 is in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 79(C) of the Electricity Supply
Act, 1948, which notified Boards' regulations. It is stated at
Para 1(ii) that the regulations shall be deemed to have come
into force with effect from 1.7.1990. In Clause 2(iv) it is stated
that 'Pensioner" means an employee who retired on or after
1.7.1990 but before the date of issue of the order. Grievance
of the writ petitioners basically was that the persons who
retired from service after 1.7.1990 were drawing more pension
than the writ petitioners. Learned Single judge referred to the
Memorandum of Settlement but did not attach much
importance to it. The Memorandum of Settlement clearly
shows that the period of settlement was from 1.7.1990 to
30.6.1994. Claim of the writ petitioners was that the employer
and its functionaries were liable to fix the pension and other
terminal benefits of the writ petitioners at par with the other
UDCs retired on or after 1.7.1990. As noted above, the
grievance was that the said category of persons was drawing
more pensions. It was pointed out that the revision of pay
scale in BPMs. No. 878 dated 5.10.1981 effective from
1.4.1981 was only for a period of 4 years and the same was
required to be revised after expiry of the period i.e. with effect
from 1.4.1985. The Board instead of revising the pay scales
with effect from 1.4.1985 revised the same with effect from
1.7.1986. It was, therefore, submitted that the classification
as done was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India,
1950 (in short the 'Constitution').
Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench clearly
overlooked the fact that there was no challenge to the
settlement. Undisputedly, the three stagnation increments
deducted from personal pay have been added to the basic pay.
There was no challenge to the settlement made under
Section 12(3) of the Act. No finding has been recorded by
either learned Single Judge or the Division Bench that the
modality adopted is wrong. It has to be noted that in terms of
the Fifth Schedule to the Act under Section 2(ra) as per Sr. No.
13 consequences flow for failure to implement the award,
settlement or agreement. There is no dispute that the Board's
decision is prospective. There is also no challenge to the
legality of the Board's decision on the ground that there is no
rational for fixing the date, except saying that it should have
been done from an earlier date i.e. 1985 and not from
1.7.1986 as done earlier. There was no challenge at the stage
it was done. The line of enquiry whether settlement was
unfair and unjust has been examined by this Court in several
decisions.
In Herbertsons Ltd. v. Workmen (1976) 4 SCC 736) this
Court called for a finding on the point whether the settlement
was fair and just and it is in the light of the findings of the
Tribunal that the appeal was disposed of. Goswami, J.
speaking for the three-Judge Bench made it clear that the
settlement cannot be judged on the touchstone of the
principles which are relevant for adjudication of an industrial
dispute. It was observed that the Tribunal fell into an error in
invoking the principles that should govern the adjudication of
a dispute regarding dearness allowance in judging whether the
settlement was just and fair. The rationale of this principle
was explained thus :
"25. There may be several factors that may
influence parties to come to a settlement as a
phased endeavour in the course of collective
bargaining. Once cordiality is established
between the employer and labour in arriving at
a settlement which operates well for the period
that is in force, there is always a likelihood of
further advances in the shape of improved
emoluments by voluntary settlement avoiding
friction and unhealthy litigation. This is the
quintessence of settlement which courts and
tribunals should endeavour to encourage. It is
in that spirit the settlement has to be judged
and not by the yardstick adopted in
scrutinizing an award in adjudication."
The line of enquiry whether settlement was unfair and
unjust in K.C.P. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer (1996) 10 SCC 446)
was adopted by a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking
through Majumdar, J. It was observed at SCC p. 451,
paragraph 21 that:
"Under these circumstances, Respondents 3 to
14 also would be ordinarily bound by this
settlement entered into by their representative
Union with the Company unless it is shown
that the said settlement was ex facie, unfair,
unjust or mala fide."
The Court came to the conclusion that the settlement
cannot be characterised to be unfair or unjust. It was further
observed that "once this conclusion is reached it is obvious
that the entire industrial dispute should have been disposed of
in the light of this settlement". It was reiterated in the case of
Tata Engg. and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Workmen ((1981) 4 SCC
627) that :
"A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden
scales and the question whether it is just and
fair has to be answered on the basis of
principles different from those which come into
play when an industrial dispute is under
adjudication."
Earlier, it was observed :
"If the settlement had been arrived at by a vast
majority of the concerned workers with their
eyes open and was also accepted by them in its
totality, it must be presumed to be just and
fair and not liable to be ignored while deciding
the reference merely because a small number
of workers (in this case 71 i.e. 11.18 per cent)
were not parties to it or refused to accept it, or
because the Tribunal was of the opinion that
the workers deserved marginally higher
emoluments than they themselves thought
they did."
These aspects were highlighted in ITC Ltd. Workers'
Welfare Association and Anr v. Management of ITC Ltd. and
Another (2002(3) SCC 411.)
Exclusion of workmen retiring before the date fixed is no
good ground to characterize settlement as unjust or unfair. In
fact in the instant case there is no challenge to the legality of
the settlement.
As the settlement entered into in the course of
conciliation proceedings assumes crucial importance in the
present case, it is necessary for us to recapitulate the fairly
well-settled legal position and principles concerning the
binding effect of the settlement and the grounds on which the
settlement is vulnerable to attack in an industrial
adjudication. Analysing the relative scope of various clauses of
Section 18, this Court in the case of Barauni Refinery
Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (1991)
1 SCC 4) succinctly summarized the position thus:
"Settlements are divided into two categories,
namely, (i) those arrived at outside the
conciliation proceedings [Section 18(i)] and (ii)
those arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings [Section 18(3)]. A settlement which
belongs to the first category has limited
application in that it merely binds the parties
to the agreement. But a settlement arrived at
in the course of conciliation proceedings with a
recognised majority union has extended
application as it will be binding on all
workmen of the establishment, even those who
belong to the minority union which had
objected to the same. To that extent it departs
from the ordinary law of contract. The object
obviously is to uphold the sanctity of
settlements reached with the active assistance
of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an
individual employee or a minority union from
scuttling the settlement. There is an
underlying assumption that a settlement
reached with the help of the Conciliation
Officer must be fair and reasonable and can,
therefore, safely be made binding not only on
the workmen belonging to the union signing
the settlement but also on the others. That is
why a settlement arrived at in the course of
conciliation proceedings is put on par with an
award made by an adjudicatory authority."
As observed by this Court in Tata Engineering's case
(supra) a settlement cannot weigh in any golden scales and the
question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the
basis of principles different from those which comes into play
when an industrial dispute is under adjudication. If the
settlement had been arrived at by a vast majority of concerned
workers with their eyes open and was also accepted by them
in its totality, it must be presumed to be just and fair and not
liable to be ignored while deciding the reference made under
the Act merely because a small number of workers were not
parties to it or refused to accept it or because the Tribunal was
on the opinion that the workers deserved marginally higher
emoluments than they themselves thought they did. The
decision in Herbertsons Ltd.'s case (supra) was followed.
As noted above there was no challenge to the settlement
which was the foundation for the Board's decision. A copy of
the Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act
before the Joint Commissioner and Labour and State
Conciliation officer, Government of Andhra Pradesh,
Hyderabad was placed on record. On the basis of the
settlement, the Board's decision was taken. Paragraph 2 of
the proceedings is very significance and read as follows:
"A Wage Negotiation Committee was
therefore constituted by the Board in the B.P.
sixth read above. The committee held detailed
discussions with the representatives of the
unions and finally reached a negotiated
settlement with the recognized union under
the code of discipline on 29.1.1991 before the
Joint Commissioner of Labour and State
Conciliation Officer under Section 12(3) of I.D.
Act."
Above being the position the judgment of the learned
Single judge and that of the Division bench affirming the same
cannot be maintained and are, therefore, set aside. The
appeal is allowed but in the circumstances no order as to
costs.
From India, Delhi
please read the above case here
regards,
Umesh Chaudhary
(welcomeumesh@yahoo.com)
================================================
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 7378 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Transmission Corpn., A.P. Ltd. & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
P. Ramachandra Rao & Anr
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & TARUN CHATTERJEE
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing
the writ appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Order of learned Single Judge allowing writ petition filed by
the respondents was affirmed.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Respondents retired from the services of the Andhra
Pradesh State Electricity Board (in short the 'Board") on
30.4.1990 after attaining the age of superannuation. The
Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. (in short the
'Corporation'), is the successor company of the Board which
came into existence with effect from 1.2.1990 by virtue of the
Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Reforms Act, 1998 (in short
the 'Reforms Act'). The pay scales of the employees were
revised with effect from 1.7.1990 by which time the
respondents herein were drawing maximum pay in the
concerned scale. The rational of fixing the date with effect from
1.7.1990 was that employees who retired prior to 1.7.1990 are
entitled to D.A. at the rate of 38% on the pension whereas the
D.A. payable to pensioners retired on or after 1.7.1990 is
12.4%, but not before the date of issue of the order. The
revised pay scales permitted grant of three annual increments
beyond the time scale in regard to those who had reached or
crossed the maximum pay as on 1.7.1986. However, in respect
of the respondents herein the additional amount was shown
as personal pay and the stagnation increments were adjusted
towards the said additional amount.
Questioning correctness of the action of the Corporation
and its functionaries the respondents herein filed writ a
petition. Prayer was to direct the appellants herein to fix their
pension and other terminal benefits at par with other UDCs.
retired on or after 1.7.1990 and to pay all the arrears of
pensions and other terminal benefits. Learned Single judge
having regard to the intended purpose of the scheme held that
the respondents have been discriminated while calculating the
pension on the ground that they had retired prior to the
introduction of the scheme. Stand of the employer in essence
was that the Board's proceedings Ms No 481 dated 4.2.1991
had application only to those who were on its rolls as on
1.7.1990. In view of the fact that the respondents retired on
30.4.1990 the said scheme has no application to them. In any
event the scheme was introduced keeping in view the
settlement dated 29.1.1991 entered into between the Wage
Negotiation Committee and the Board before the Joint
Commissioner of Labour and State Conciliation Officer in
terms of Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in
short the 'Act') and the same cannot be the subject matter of
interpretation in the writ petition. In the Appeal its stand
before learned Single Judge was reiterated before the Division
Bench. Stand of the writ petitioners was that the learned
Single Judge was justified in its conclusion.
The Division Bench upheld the view taken by the learned
Single Judge. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in
D.S. Nakara & Others V. Union of India (1983 (1) SCC 305) it
was held that the cut off date fixed was discriminatory.
In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
highlighted that the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench had not considered the issues in their proper
perspective. D.S. Nakara's case (supra) has no application to
the facts of the present case. There was no challenge to the
settlement and the only challenge relating to rational of fixing
the cut off date with effect from 1.7.1990. The conclusion that
the respondents were entitled to the stagnation increment
deducting the same from the personal pay is clearly tenable.
Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand
supported the judgment of learned Single Judge as affirmed by
the Division Bench.
A brief reference to the factual position would be
necessary. Relevant portion of the Board's proceedings dated
4.2.1991 are as follows:
"The scales of pay of Office Staff, O& M
Staff, Construction Staff, Medical Staff, Fire
Fighting Staff, Security Staff and Teaching Staff
etc. were revised with effect from 1.7.86 in the
B.P. first read above as subsequently amended,
as per the negotiated settlements with the
employees Unions. The said settlements expired
on 30.6.90."
As result the earlier settlement expired on 30.6.1990 the
paras 5 & 6 are also relevant and they read as follows :
"The A.P.S.E. Board also directs that the
amount of stagnation increments not released
earlier in 1986 pay scales but adjusted against
P.P. shall now be released on 30.6.1990 but
effect shall be given from 1.7.1990 or from the
date of going over to the revised scales, as the
case may be, this amount will be taken into
account for the purpose of fixation of pay in
the revised pay scales.
The date of option for the revised pay scales
shall be 1.7.1990 or the date on which an
employee earns his next increment in the
existing scale of pay."
The notification issued on 4.2.1991 is in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 79(C) of the Electricity Supply
Act, 1948, which notified Boards' regulations. It is stated at
Para 1(ii) that the regulations shall be deemed to have come
into force with effect from 1.7.1990. In Clause 2(iv) it is stated
that 'Pensioner" means an employee who retired on or after
1.7.1990 but before the date of issue of the order. Grievance
of the writ petitioners basically was that the persons who
retired from service after 1.7.1990 were drawing more pension
than the writ petitioners. Learned Single judge referred to the
Memorandum of Settlement but did not attach much
importance to it. The Memorandum of Settlement clearly
shows that the period of settlement was from 1.7.1990 to
30.6.1994. Claim of the writ petitioners was that the employer
and its functionaries were liable to fix the pension and other
terminal benefits of the writ petitioners at par with the other
UDCs retired on or after 1.7.1990. As noted above, the
grievance was that the said category of persons was drawing
more pensions. It was pointed out that the revision of pay
scale in BPMs. No. 878 dated 5.10.1981 effective from
1.4.1981 was only for a period of 4 years and the same was
required to be revised after expiry of the period i.e. with effect
from 1.4.1985. The Board instead of revising the pay scales
with effect from 1.4.1985 revised the same with effect from
1.7.1986. It was, therefore, submitted that the classification
as done was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India,
1950 (in short the 'Constitution').
Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench clearly
overlooked the fact that there was no challenge to the
settlement. Undisputedly, the three stagnation increments
deducted from personal pay have been added to the basic pay.
There was no challenge to the settlement made under
Section 12(3) of the Act. No finding has been recorded by
either learned Single Judge or the Division Bench that the
modality adopted is wrong. It has to be noted that in terms of
the Fifth Schedule to the Act under Section 2(ra) as per Sr. No.
13 consequences flow for failure to implement the award,
settlement or agreement. There is no dispute that the Board's
decision is prospective. There is also no challenge to the
legality of the Board's decision on the ground that there is no
rational for fixing the date, except saying that it should have
been done from an earlier date i.e. 1985 and not from
1.7.1986 as done earlier. There was no challenge at the stage
it was done. The line of enquiry whether settlement was
unfair and unjust has been examined by this Court in several
decisions.
In Herbertsons Ltd. v. Workmen (1976) 4 SCC 736) this
Court called for a finding on the point whether the settlement
was fair and just and it is in the light of the findings of the
Tribunal that the appeal was disposed of. Goswami, J.
speaking for the three-Judge Bench made it clear that the
settlement cannot be judged on the touchstone of the
principles which are relevant for adjudication of an industrial
dispute. It was observed that the Tribunal fell into an error in
invoking the principles that should govern the adjudication of
a dispute regarding dearness allowance in judging whether the
settlement was just and fair. The rationale of this principle
was explained thus :
"25. There may be several factors that may
influence parties to come to a settlement as a
phased endeavour in the course of collective
bargaining. Once cordiality is established
between the employer and labour in arriving at
a settlement which operates well for the period
that is in force, there is always a likelihood of
further advances in the shape of improved
emoluments by voluntary settlement avoiding
friction and unhealthy litigation. This is the
quintessence of settlement which courts and
tribunals should endeavour to encourage. It is
in that spirit the settlement has to be judged
and not by the yardstick adopted in
scrutinizing an award in adjudication."
The line of enquiry whether settlement was unfair and
unjust in K.C.P. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer (1996) 10 SCC 446)
was adopted by a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking
through Majumdar, J. It was observed at SCC p. 451,
paragraph 21 that:
"Under these circumstances, Respondents 3 to
14 also would be ordinarily bound by this
settlement entered into by their representative
Union with the Company unless it is shown
that the said settlement was ex facie, unfair,
unjust or mala fide."
The Court came to the conclusion that the settlement
cannot be characterised to be unfair or unjust. It was further
observed that "once this conclusion is reached it is obvious
that the entire industrial dispute should have been disposed of
in the light of this settlement". It was reiterated in the case of
Tata Engg. and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Workmen ((1981) 4 SCC
627) that :
"A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden
scales and the question whether it is just and
fair has to be answered on the basis of
principles different from those which come into
play when an industrial dispute is under
adjudication."
Earlier, it was observed :
"If the settlement had been arrived at by a vast
majority of the concerned workers with their
eyes open and was also accepted by them in its
totality, it must be presumed to be just and
fair and not liable to be ignored while deciding
the reference merely because a small number
of workers (in this case 71 i.e. 11.18 per cent)
were not parties to it or refused to accept it, or
because the Tribunal was of the opinion that
the workers deserved marginally higher
emoluments than they themselves thought
they did."
These aspects were highlighted in ITC Ltd. Workers'
Welfare Association and Anr v. Management of ITC Ltd. and
Another (2002(3) SCC 411.)
Exclusion of workmen retiring before the date fixed is no
good ground to characterize settlement as unjust or unfair. In
fact in the instant case there is no challenge to the legality of
the settlement.
As the settlement entered into in the course of
conciliation proceedings assumes crucial importance in the
present case, it is necessary for us to recapitulate the fairly
well-settled legal position and principles concerning the
binding effect of the settlement and the grounds on which the
settlement is vulnerable to attack in an industrial
adjudication. Analysing the relative scope of various clauses of
Section 18, this Court in the case of Barauni Refinery
Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (1991)
1 SCC 4) succinctly summarized the position thus:
"Settlements are divided into two categories,
namely, (i) those arrived at outside the
conciliation proceedings [Section 18(i)] and (ii)
those arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings [Section 18(3)]. A settlement which
belongs to the first category has limited
application in that it merely binds the parties
to the agreement. But a settlement arrived at
in the course of conciliation proceedings with a
recognised majority union has extended
application as it will be binding on all
workmen of the establishment, even those who
belong to the minority union which had
objected to the same. To that extent it departs
from the ordinary law of contract. The object
obviously is to uphold the sanctity of
settlements reached with the active assistance
of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an
individual employee or a minority union from
scuttling the settlement. There is an
underlying assumption that a settlement
reached with the help of the Conciliation
Officer must be fair and reasonable and can,
therefore, safely be made binding not only on
the workmen belonging to the union signing
the settlement but also on the others. That is
why a settlement arrived at in the course of
conciliation proceedings is put on par with an
award made by an adjudicatory authority."
As observed by this Court in Tata Engineering's case
(supra) a settlement cannot weigh in any golden scales and the
question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the
basis of principles different from those which comes into play
when an industrial dispute is under adjudication. If the
settlement had been arrived at by a vast majority of concerned
workers with their eyes open and was also accepted by them
in its totality, it must be presumed to be just and fair and not
liable to be ignored while deciding the reference made under
the Act merely because a small number of workers were not
parties to it or refused to accept it or because the Tribunal was
on the opinion that the workers deserved marginally higher
emoluments than they themselves thought they did. The
decision in Herbertsons Ltd.'s case (supra) was followed.
As noted above there was no challenge to the settlement
which was the foundation for the Board's decision. A copy of
the Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act
before the Joint Commissioner and Labour and State
Conciliation officer, Government of Andhra Pradesh,
Hyderabad was placed on record. On the basis of the
settlement, the Board's decision was taken. Paragraph 2 of
the proceedings is very significance and read as follows:
"A Wage Negotiation Committee was
therefore constituted by the Board in the B.P.
sixth read above. The committee held detailed
discussions with the representatives of the
unions and finally reached a negotiated
settlement with the recognized union under
the code of discipline on 29.1.1991 before the
Joint Commissioner of Labour and State
Conciliation Officer under Section 12(3) of I.D.
Act."
Above being the position the judgment of the learned
Single judge and that of the Division bench affirming the same
cannot be maintained and are, therefore, set aside. The
appeal is allowed but in the circumstances no order as to
costs.
From India, Delhi
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Case Study on Wage Settlement Negotiation.pdf